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Moving out of Committed Relationships  
 
Abstract 
In conditions of social uncertainty—i.e., when exchanges are subject to the hazards of 
opportunism—committed relationships promote both the shadow of the future and the shadow of 
the past necessary for cooperation.  For this reason, some argue that exchanges can be self-
governed without the need of legal enforcement and other formal controls.  While this 
conclusion is correct when the value of a long-term relationship does not vary much over time, 
we provide new experimental evidence showing that it is invalid when individuals face high 
exchange value uncertainty—i.e., when there are constantly new opportunities to transact with 
more valuable partners outside committed circles.  Under both social and exchange value 
uncertainty, a reduction in commitment can potentially increase exchange performance, at the 
cost of a potential reduction in cooperation.  By creating safeguards in market exchanges, 
contract enforcement can make individuals more willing to move out of committed relationships 
and into relationships with higher exchange value.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Social researchers have long emphasized the advantages of committed relationships, i.e., 
long-term exchanges between the same partners.  Game-theoretic logic suggests that 
commitment provides a “shadow of the future” to discourage opportunistic behavior, whenever 
the payoffs attained in a long-term exchange surpass any short-term gain from defection (Abreu, 
1988; Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987).  Additionally, as parties interact repeatedly, committed 
exchanges also create a history or “shadow of the past” which promotes the emergence of social 
attachments, social norms, and trust based on familiarity (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995a; 
Macneil, 1978; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  These factors jointly contribute to the achievement 
and stability of cooperation in recurring exchanges, as individuals become less willing to engage 
in actions that potentially harm one another.  The cooperation-based benefits of recurring 
exchanges has led social exchange scholars (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Kollock, 1994) to propose 
that committed relationships are particularly important in situations involving social uncertainty, 
which refers to “risk of being exploited in social interactions” (Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 
1998: 170).  Social uncertainty basically results from the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, long recognized by economists as instances of opportunistic behavior (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1985). 
However, committed relationships have an important drawback.  As discussed by Blau 
(1964: 161), 
 
Strong attachments prevent individuals from exploring alternative opportunities and taking 
advantage of them to increase their rewards and improve their positions—from turning to a 
better consultant, taking a more promising job, moving to a more desirable community, or 
switching to a more profitable occupation.  The immobility resulting from firm attachments 
precludes the adjustments in the social structure required for exchange transactions to yield 
fair returns to all parties. 
Thus, in many circumstances parties would also like to pursue exchanges with alternative 
partners, which may offer opportunities unavailable through existing partnerships.  Using Blau’s 
(1964) terminology, individuals would like to have mobility in their social relations.    2
Granovetter’s (1973) seminal work suggests that “weak ties” or distant exchanges are 
instrumental in generating new information and opportunities.  Afuah (2000) illustrates this issue 
in the context of buyer-supplier relationships.  He maintains that in the advent of technological 
change, “staying with the old supplier means that the manufacturer can build on existing close 
relationships but must grapple with the problems that the supplier faces in making the transition 
to the new technology.  If the change is radical enough to suppliers, they may not be able to 
supply components with the type of quality that the firm needs to be competitive with the new 
technology” (Afuah, 2000: 389).  Afuah’s (2000) discussion suggests that a reduction in 
commitment is necessary in settings where, apart from problems of social uncertainty, the 
intrinsic value of an exchange with a particular partner is also uncertain (e.g. Kranton & 
Minehart, 2000).  We refer to this situation as exchange value uncertainty.  Thus, in buyer-
supplier relationships where the product being exchanged is subject to rapid and uncertain 
technological change, there is a possibility that, in the future, a new supplier with lower costs or 
better technology will appear.  Incumbent suppliers may be unable to match innovations or 
production efficiencies borne by alternative suppliers.  Thus, to increase exchange performance, 
buyers must be able to switch to suppliers offering lower prices or superior technology whenever 
they emerge.        
It is clear that there will be a tension between commitment and mobility in situations 
involving both social and exchange value uncertainty.  While committed relationships solve the 
former, they severely constrain the opportunities of individuals facing the latter.  Mobility, in 
turn, allows individuals to pursue valuable opportunities more often, but tends to undermine 
cooperation in conditions of social uncertainty.  If individuals switch partners frequently, they 
may develop a reputation of not preserving relationships, which damages the shadow of the 
future.  Furthermore, lack of repeated interaction precludes the evolution of cooperative norms 
and thereby damages the shadow of the past.  Anticipating this fact and fearing the risk of 
opportunistic behavior, individuals may become reluctant to transact with unfamiliar actors.  As 
a result, exchanges may exhibit low performance: individuals may stick to repeated transactions   3
even when there are more valuable, efficient opportunities with alternative partners.  To increase 
exchange performance, individuals would need to move out of committed relationships; but, by 
doing so, they may damage cooperation.  Surprisingly, focused discussions on how individuals 
may overcome this dilemma are scarce in the literature (see however Lazzarini & Zenger, 2002; 
Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).   
In this paper, we address this void by analyzing individuals’ willingness to move out of 
committed relationships under both social and exchange value uncertainty.  We examine, in 
particular, how individuals respond to an increase in exchange value uncertainty, which requires 
mobility to enhance exchange performance.  But since a reduction in commitment is likely to 
undermine cooperation when social uncertainty is present, we also examine mechanisms that can 
effectively induce individuals to sever ongoing relationships and transact with new actors.  
Specifically, we analyze the role of contract enforcement as a mechanism that can support lower 
levels of commitments   While organizational economics has focused on the role of contractual 
incentives in increasing exchange performance, we point out the role of contracts in reducing the 
downstream losses faced by individuals whenever their exchange partners act opportunistically.  
In this sense, a critical role of contracts is not only the incentives they generate for cooperation, 
but also the extent to which they reduce the perceived losses from opportunistic behavior in non-
committed exchanges, thereby increasing individuals’ propensity to transact with new partners 
(Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002).  A key hypothesis of our study is that contract 
enforcement will be especially beneficial when exchange value uncertainty increases.  This is 
because, by limiting the losses from opportunistic behavior, contract enforcement makes 
individuals more willing to transact with new partners, thereby expanding the set of valuable 
options that individuals can appropriate in market exchanges.   
In addition, we examine the role of trust as a personal trait that influences commitment 
decisions.  Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994: 160) posit that trust “helps people move out of 
committed relations.”  We are particularly interested in what Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994: 
139) call general trust, which refers to “a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general.”    4
General trust increases mobility because it reduces the perceived likelihood that new partners 
will act opportunistically regardless of the existence of formal safeguards.  For this reason, some 
argue that trust reduces the need of contract enforcement in conditions of social uncertainty 
(Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 1993).  In other words, individuals exhibiting high general trust will 
be more willing to transact with new partners and therefore their commitment decisions will be 
less affected by the prospect of contract enforcement.         
We use experimental evidence to test these hypotheses.  Following Kollock (1994), we create 
a repeated buyer-seller market involving social uncertainty: there is a risk that sellers will act 
opportunistically.  In every period, buyers decide to switch to new sellers or stay with sellers 
with whom they have transacted in the past.  We manipulate both exchange value uncertainty—
namely, the extent to which buyers could, in every period, increase their payoffs by transacting 
with new sellers—and the existence or not of contract enforcement.  Although we do not 
manipulate different levels of trust, we examine how individuals’ propensity to trust exchange 
partners moderates the effect of contract enforcement.  We find evidence consistent with our 
hypothesis that contract enforcement reduces commitment and, as a result, increases exchange 
performance in conditions of high exchange value uncertainty.   
This result runs counter to usual arguments in the literature that formal safeguards may be 
unnecessary because, in conditions of social uncertainty, cooperation can be satisfactorily 
supported through committed relations (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Kollock, 1994; Taylor, 1987).  
While this argument is valid in conditions of low exchange value uncertainty, it is no longer 
appropriate when exchange value uncertainty is high, which implies that mobility is critical to 
increase exchange performance.  With the creation of large trade networks that invariably results 
from globalization and new technologies (such as e-commerce), individuals constantly face 
valuable exchange opportunities with new partners, and hence the analysis of mechanisms that 
induce individuals to move out of committed relationships becomes crucial.  Our results provide 
no clear evidence, however, on the role of trust.  But we note that trust is not a manipulated   5
variable in our experiment and hence our study may lack sufficient heterogeneity with respect to 
this variable.    
The paper is structured as follows.  In the second section, we present our theory in detail.  In 
the third section, we discuss our experimental procedure.  We next present and discuss the 
results.  A conclusion section follows.   
 
THEORY 
Social uncertainty and commitment 
Social uncertainty refers to “the risk of being exploited in social interactions” (Yamagishi et 
al., 1998: 170).  Thus, sellers may misrepresent information about the quality of the products 
prior to buyer purchase, which is an instance of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970).  Also, sellers 
may exert low effort after buyers agree on acquiring their products or services, which is a 
problem of moral hazard (Pauly, 1968).  These kinds of opportunistic behavior create potential 
expropriation losses in market exchanges and thus require organizational effort to support 
cooperative relations.  Organizational economists have emphasized the role of incentives and 
ownership to overcome opportunism (e.g. Milgrom et al., 1992; Williamson, 1985).  Others 
scholars, however, have stressed the role of informal mechanisms based on social patterns of 
interaction among individuals.   
The creation of committed relationships—repeated, long-term exchanges between the same 
actors—allows for a host of informal mechanisms that support cooperation under social 
uncertainty.  On the one hand, commitment implies that the likelihood that individuals will meet 
in the future will be high.  Using Axelrod’s (1984) term, commitment increases the “shadow of 
the future.”  This allows for the establishment of informal retaliation strategies, i.e., an individual 
can refuse to transact in the future with exchange parties who defected in the past.  If the long-
term payoff from cooperation is sufficiently high—more precisely, if the payoff surpasses any 
short-term gain from opportunistic behavior—then cooperation can be sustained even among 
self-interested individuals (Abreu, 1988; Klein & Leffler, 1981; Taylor, 1987; Telser, 1980).    6
Other authors, however, suggest that this is only a partial assessment of the role of commitment.  
By transacting repeatedly, partners become familiar with one another and develop social 
attachments and norms (Gulati, 1995a; Ring et al., 1994; Uzzi, 1996).  This “shadow of the past” 
constitutes the basis of socially embedded exchanges (Granovetter, 1985) and relational patterns 
of governance (Macneil, 1978), characterized by mutual interests and collaborative orientation.
1 
It is not our objective to analyze empirically the effect of social uncertainty on commitment 
decisions, mainly because previous studies have examined this effect in detail.  Thus, in a buyer-
seller experimental setting, Kollock (1994) finds that subjects develop committed relations 
especially when sellers can act opportunistically by delivering low quality products after 
purchase.  By contrast, when product quality is not a matter of concern, commitment is lower.  
Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998) obtain similar findings in a different experimental setting.  
In a field study of investment banking, Podolny (1994) finds that in conditions of social 
uncertainty (which he terms “market” uncertainty) firms tend to choose actors with whom they 
have transacted in the past.  Instead of evaluating the effect of social uncertainty on commitment, 
we assume throughout that the risk of opportunism is always present, and examine a factor that 
actually makes long-term exchanges less attractive: exchange value uncertainty.  
Exchange value uncertainty and mobility 
We define exchange value uncertainty as a situation where individuals are uncertain of the 
value that they can attain in future exchanges with the same partner, even if there is no 
propensity to act opportunistically (e.g. Kranton et al., 2000).   For instance, as discussed in the 
introduction, a buyer may not know with certainty whether a supplier will be able to keep up 
with radical innovations introduced by alternative firms or match low-cost suppliers that may 
emerge over time (Afuah, 2000; Harrigan, 1988; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000).  Also, 
buyers may not know with certainty whether sellers will be able to adjust production capacities 
                                                 
1 Following Cook and Emerson (1978) and Kollock (1994), our definition of commitment is purely behavioral: it 
derives from revealed choices of exchange partners in a given social setting.   In a different approach, Lawler and 
Yoon (1993) study affective sources of commitment between individuals.  Through repeated interaction, partners 
also tend to develop emotional attachments, which further reinforces the role of commitment in promoting 
cooperation (Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992).   7
when faced with variations in the demand of downstream products (Eccles, 1981; Jones, 
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).  For instance, if demand suddenly increases, buyers may not be able 
to assemble final products if incumbent suppliers face short-term constraints to expand the 
production of components.  It would be desirable to procure from alternative suppliers that, for 
some reason, have excess capacity at that particular moment.       
Exchange value uncertainty discourages the development of committed relationships.  This is 
because new and more valuable exchange opportunities with alternative partners will likely 
emerge over time.  In other words, there is a high probability of a large gap between what an 
individual obtains in the current relationship and what that individual could obtain in an 
alternative relationship (Cook et al., 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Yamagishi et al., 1998).  If 
these exchange values were stable over time, individuals could switch to the best partners and 
simply maintain these relationships in the future.  But in a situation of high exchange value 
uncertainty, the value gap between a current and an alternative relationship is both probabilistic 
and volatile.  To increase performance in market exchanges often necessitates moving out of 
committed relationships to access more attractive exchange opportunities. Thus, exchange value 
uncertainty requires social mobility: if individuals maintain committed relationships, they not 
only fail to capture valuable exchange opportunities, but also may incur losses if long-term 
partners fail to meet their changing demands.  This leads to: 
Hypothesis 1.  An increase in exchange value uncertainty will reduce commitment.     
However, in conditions of social uncertainty—i.e. where exchange hazards are present—a 
reduction of commitment is likely to damage cooperation.  Individuals who switch partners 
frequently may destroy their reputation, because existing or future partners will perceive a low 
likelihood that the exchange will continue in the future (Podolny & Page, 1998; Singh & 
Mitchell, 1996), thereby undermining the shadow of the future.  For instance, Helper (1991) 
documents that U.S. automakers have faced a “legacy of mistrust” on the part of auto suppliers 
due to a policy of frequently adopting competing bidding and switching partners at will.    8
Moreover, individuals who switch partners frequently will not build close relationships and 
therefore will not benefit from the shadow of the past.  Consequently:    
Hypothesis 2. In conditions of social uncertainty, a reduction in commitment will undermine 
cooperation.     
Due to this effect, some individuals may be reluctant to transact with alternative partners 
even in conditions of high exchange value uncertainty.  But by doing so individuals will likely 
forego valuable opportunities outside certain social circles, which tends to reduce exchange 
performance.  Thus, it becomes important to examine mechanisms that induce individuals to 
move out of committed relationships in conditions of high exchange value uncertainty, given that 
social uncertainty creates hazards in non-committed exchanges.  We next discuss how contract 
enforcement may be such a mechanism. 
The role of contract enforcement 
In conditions of social uncertainty, contract enforcement can reduce commitment in two 
ways.  As discussed by organizational economists (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Klein, 
1996), contracts curb the potential short-term gains that individuals can attain by engaging in 
opportunistic behavior.  This incentive effect may facilitate the establishment of retaliation 
strategies because the relative benefit of cooperating in the long-term increases.  In the process, 
contracts may serve to support the evolution of long-term, committed relationships (Lazzarini, 
Miller, & Zenger, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  We emphasize in this study another related 
role of contracts: they can act as a safeguard against possible exchange losses that the other party 
may face in conditions of social uncertainty.  Namely, contracts may guarantee that at least part 
of the agreement will be honored, or that the agreement will be honored with some probability.
2  
As a result, there will be more social mobility even when the exchange is subject to risks.  In 
other words, individuals will be more willing to transact with strangers (Johnson et al., 2002) , 
                                                 
2 To make our discussion more interesting and realistic, we focus on “incomplete” contracts—i.e., contracts that are 
only able to enforce certain easy-to-meter exchange dimensions or that have some probability that the deal will not 
be enforced due to cognitive inability to anticipate future contingencies or limitations by the courts (Tirole, 1999).   9
even for short durations, which is an outcome particularly critical under high exchange value 
uncertainty.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 3.  In conditions of social uncertainty, contract enforcement will magnify the 
effect of exchange value uncertainty in reducing commitment.     
A consequence of this proposition is that contract enforcement will be most beneficial when 
exchange value uncertainty is high.  Without any contract, individuals may perceive large 
potential losses in non-committed exchanges and therefore pursue repeated dealings even when 
there are valuable opportunities with alternative partners.  By contrast, when exchange value 
uncertainty is low, the advantages of contract enforcement are minimal.  This is because 
exchange performance is not strongly penalized if individuals maintain the same partners, and 
thus cooperation can be satisfactorily supported through highly committed relationships.  
Furthermore, there are possible inefficiencies associated with the use of contracts.  The most 
obvious cause stems from the costs of using the legal system (Chen, 2000; Lazzarini et al., 
2001).  In addition, some authors propose that contract enforcement may damage the quality of 
relationships.  Contractual clauses and punishments may signal distrust and reduce individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate (Macaulay, 1963; Sitkin & Roth, 1993).  Furthermore, the explicit 
incentives brought by the contract may crowd out or substitute for the intrinsic incentives 
embodied in a committed relationship (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Frey, 1997; 
Taylor, 1987).  Sellers may become less motivated to act cooperatively if they perceive the 
existence of external controls that are actually designated to suppress defection (Lubell & 
Scholz, 2001; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  Contract enforcement must therefore bring benefits 
that overcome such possible inefficiencies.  Since, as discussed before, those benefits increase 
with exchange value uncertainty, we propose:   
Hypothesis 4.  In conditions of social uncertainty, contract enforcement will increase 
exchange performance to a greater degree when exchange value uncertainty is high.       10
The role of trust 
Following Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), we distinguish between two types of trust.  
General trust refers to the expectation that people in general will not act opportunistically even 
when they have the opportunity to do so.  Knowledge-based trust, by contrast, refers to the 
expectation that familiar people—i.e., people with whom an individual has interacted in the 
past—will not act opportunistically (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992).  Trust is 
independent from the existence of contractual provisions or controls in an exchange; it is a 
personal trait that influences commitment decisions in the sense that it affects an individual’s 
assessment of the benevolence of other actors (Yamagishi et al., 1994).
3  But since individuals 
exhibiting high general trust will likely perceive lower hazards in non-recurring exchanges or in 
transactions with strangers, they will be less affected by the presence or absence of contract 
enforcement even in conditions of social uncertainty.  Thus, Granovetter (1985: 489) contends 
that formal institutions “do not produce trust but instead are a functional substitute for it.”  
Putnam (1993) also observes that societies with a high degree of do not need strong legal 
enforcement.  In the same vein, Gulati (1995a: 93) argues that “trust can substitute for 
hierarchical contracts in many exchanges.”  These arguments suggest that the main beneficiaries 
of contract enforcement will be individuals with low general trust, who perceive a higher risk of 
opportunistic behavior outside committed circles: 
Hypothesis 5.  In conditions of social uncertainty, contract enforcement will reduce 
commitment to a greater degree for individuals exhibiting low general trust.     
Knowledge-based trust, by contrast, is likely to show an opposite effect.  Knowledge-based 
trust is trust that emerges from the history of an exchange.  Thus, individuals exhibiting this kind 
of trust will feel more comfortable exchanging with actors with whom they have interacted in the 
past.  Using our previous terminology, individuals with high knowledge-based trust will likely 
                                                 
3 Note that our definition of trust does not follow a “calculative” logic (Hardin, 2001; Williamson, 1993)—trust here 
is independent of exchange controls or incentives that may induce even self-interested individuals to cooperate.   11
put more value on the shadow of the past.  For this reason, these individuals may be less tempted 
to transact with strangers unless some safeguard is in place, which leads to: 
 Hypothesis 6.  In conditions of social uncertainty, contract enforcement will reduce 
commitment to a greater degree for individuals exhibiting high knowledge-based trust.     
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Design 
We employ a 2×2 factorial design whereby we manipulate the presence of contract 
enforcement and the level of exchange value uncertainty.  Since the effect of social uncertainty 
has been explored in previous research (Kollock, 1994; Podolny, 1994; Yamagishi et al., 1998), 
we treat it as a constant in our experiment.  We do not manipulate the level of general and 
knowledge-based trust in our experimental groups, but we assess how these two personal traits 
affect commitment decisions and exchange performance. 
Experimental setting 
Each treatment cell involves two experimental groups, where each group corresponds to a 
market with 6 buyers and 7 sellers.  Buyers and sellers have repeated opportunities to transact 
during several rounds.  The product being exchanged has two quality levels, high and low.  
Similarly to Kollock (1994), this creates a situation of social uncertainty since sellers may act 
opportunistically and deliver low-quality products to buyers after purchase.  Payoffs are 
computed based on “experimental points.”  Low quality always costs zero to sellers, and yields  
zero to buyers.  High quality yields 100 experimental points to buyers, and costs a variable 
number of experimental points to sellers, to be explained below.  Buyers pay a certain price, in 
experimental points, to receive a unit of the product.  In every round, the sequence of events is as 
follows: 
First stage: sellers submit price offers.  Sellers begin by offering prices to supply a high-
quality product to as many buyers as they want.  Thus, sellers can offer different prices to all   12
buyers on the market, to a single buyer, or to a sub-set of buyers.  If sellers do not want to submit 
price offers, then they exit and wait until the next round. 
Second stage: buyers choose sellers.  Buyers then observe the prices chosen by sellers.  A 
buyer i thus receives a vector of price offers, pij, from all suppliers j who have submitted offers to 
that buyer.  Buyers do not see the vector of offers to other buyers on the market.  With this 
information, a buyer then requests the product from only one seller who has submitted a price 
offer.  However, a seller may sell the product to more than one buyer if he or she receives more 
than one request.  If buyers do not want to buy the product, then they exit and wait until the next 
round.  But if buyers accept the price offer, then they pay for the product beforehand.  Thus, they 
cannot refuse to pay if sellers deliver low quality products. 
Third stage: sellers choose the quality level of the product.  Sellers are next informed about 
the buyers who accepted their offers, and then decide the quality level of the product to be 
delivered.  Note that sellers may send products to more than one buyer, and may chose different 
quality levels for each buyer. 
Buyers are then informed about the choice of their sellers.  Since buyers pay for the product 
beforehand, sellers can simply receive the payment and deliver low quality, which is associated 
with zero production cost.  But since the market is repeated, cooperation—i.e., delivery of high 
quality—may emerge if the same buyers and sellers transact, to some extent, repeatedly.  In 
every round, sellers can submit new price offers, buyers can choose different sellers, and sellers 
can vary the chosen quality to each buyer.  The outcome of each round is informed only to the 
buyers and sellers who effectively transact with one another.  Thus, market-level reputation 
mechanisms (Kandori, 1992; Milgrom, North, & Weingast, 1990) are not feasible; sellers can 
only form a reputation with the buyers with whom they already transacted in previous rounds.  
However, all subjects are informed about the underlying “network” structure on the market.  
Namely, they know who transacted with whom in every period—based on anonymous identity 
codes—and therefore observe the revealed commitment levels chosen by participants.  Subjects   13
are informed that the experiment will last at least 15 rounds, but that, beginning from the 15
th 
round, there is a 50% chance that the whole experiment will end. 
Transactions are mediated by a software system linking buyers’ and sellers’ computer 
terminals in a network.  Buyers and sellers stay in the same room, seated in cubicles with a 
computer terminal.  However, they are not informed who is playing the role of buyer or seller.  
Before the experiment begins, instructors read the experimental instructions and verify subjects’ 
understanding of the procedures through a quiz.  Instructors then demonstrate the software and 
conduct a practice session where each subject plays against himself or herself (i.e., as both buyer 
and seller).  Subjects are next privately informed of the role they will play in the experiment and 
are assigned an anonymous identity code.    
Manipulating exchange value uncertainty 
We manipulate exchange value uncertainty by varying, from period to period, the costs that 
each seller will face to deliver high quality to each buyer, in experimental points.  The cost to 
deliver low quality is constant (zero).  Costs to deliver high-quality products are randomly drawn 
in an independent manner across sellers, buyers with whom sellers may transact, and periods.  
Such costs are private information: neither buyers nor sellers are informed about the exact costs 
of other sellers.  In the treatment involving high exchange value uncertainty, costs are drawn 
from a discrete uniform distribution involving integers between 0 and 100.  To facilitate 
understanding, denote cij as the cost that a seller j incurs to deliver high quality to buyer i.  In our 
market, which has 6 buyers and 7 sellers, costs cij are the entries of a 6×7 cost matrix that varies 
across periods.  Thus, suppose that in a certain period random draws are such that the cost matrix 
becomes 





















0 91 3 68 28 18 95
83 25 41 23 63 86 40
83 4 64 11 44 82 98
19 3 87 2 24 53 25
52 61 37 31 83 38 29
40 21 3 56 92 55 89
. 
 
The matrix shows, for instance, that seller 2 (second column) incurs a cost of 82 points to 
supply a high-quality product to buyer 4 (fourth row), and a cost of 18 points to supply a high-
quality product to buyer 6 (sixth row).  Also, to deliver high quality to buyer 3, seller 5 incurs 87 
points, whereas seller 4 incurs 2 points.  This example serves to illustrate the tension in the 
experiment when exchange value uncertainty is high.   If prices are aligned with costs, buyer 3 
could possibly make a lot of experimental points by transacting with seller 4 instead of, say, 
seller 5.  But if buyer 3 has successfully transacted with seller 5 before—possibly because this 
seller used to have low costs—and has never transacted with seller 4, then buyer 3 may be 
reluctant to transact with the latter fearing that a low-quality product will be delivered.  Also, 
buyer 3 may refuse to sever a long-term relationship with seller 5 to avoid undermining this 
seller’s willingness to cooperate in the future.  Recall that a low-quality product has zero value to 
buyers and hence they necessarily lose experimental points if sellers do not deliver high quality. 
In the low exchange value uncertainty condition, by contrast, costs have a substantially lower 
dispersion: they are randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution between 45 and 55.  
Note that the expected cost that sellers will face from period to period is equal to the treatment 
with high exchange value uncertainty (50 points)—only the dispersion of costs changes.  Since 
costs do not vary much in the treatment involving low exchange value uncertainty, there should 
be no large gap between what buyers could receive with an alternative seller and what they 
receive with their ongoing partners.   15
Manipulating contract enforcement  
In the treatment where contract enforcement is possible, buyers also choose to offer a 
contract or not to transact with the seller simultaneously to their acceptance of a particular offer 
(i.e., in the second stage).  In the other treatment, contract enforcement is neither allowed nor 
mentioned to participants.  The contract automatically forces sellers to deliver high quality 
whenever they choose low quality.  Thus, this is a type of contract referred to in the legal 
literature as specific performance, where “breaching parties [are] ordered by the state to perform 
their part of the bargain” (Rosett, 1994: 344).  In our experiment, the contract is enforced with 
50% probability.  If a contract is offered and the seller chooses low quality afterwards, then the 
buyer ends up receiving the high quality product for the accepted price in 50% of the cases.  In 
the other instances, buyers end up receiving low quality and are not reimbursed.  It is easy to 
check that, in a one-shot exchange, sellers can always get more experimental points by choosing 
low quality even when a contract is in place.  If the contract is enforced, they will at worst incur 
the costs to deliver high quality, which yields a payoff equal to what they would get had they 
cooperated in the first place.  But if the contract is not enforced, which occurs with 50% 
probability, they may earn a substantial amount of points because the cost to deliver low quality 
is zero.  This feature serves to minimize the role of contracts as incentive devices in our 
experimental setting, and highlights their role as safeguards to buyers, which constitutes our 
main interest.  Given that the contract is enforced with 50% probability, if sellers choose low 
quality then buyers can always expect to receive more points when a contract is in place than 
when they do not have this safeguard.   
The use of contracts costs buyers 5 experimental points in every round.  Sellers do not incur 
any extra cost when they exchange under a contract.  Since the contract holds for a single period 
only, buyers are free to change their use of contract enforcement across experimental rounds.  
The formulas to compute the final payoffs of buyers and sellers, with and without contract 
enforcement, are presented in Table 1. 
<Table 1 around here>   16
Measuring trust   
      To measure buyers’ general and knowledge-based trust, we employ a questionnaire using the 
items reported by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) in their final measures of those constructs.  
The questionnaire is administered at the end of each experimental session and measures buyers’ 
agreement to particular statements using a seven-point Likert scale.  Table 2 shows the items 
used in the questionnaire, and their factor loadings (using promax rotation) in a two-factor model 
estimated through maximum likelihood.  The two-factor model significantly outperforms the 
solution with no factor (χ
2 = 209.56, p < 0.01), thus suggesting that items are indeed measuring 
two different constructs.  Since the general trust items 4 and 5 do not display a clear pattern of 
loading, we drop them from the final measures.  Thus, the final measure of general trust is the 
sum of the scores for items 1, 2, 3 (reverse-scored), and 6 (Cronbach alpha = 0.822), whereas the 
final measure of knowledge-based trust is the sum of the scores for all corresponding items, 
where item 2 is reverse-scored (Cronbach alpha = 0.851).  To facilitate comparison, we 
standardize these final measures. 
<Table 2 around here> 
      Since we use a post-experimental questionnaire, it is possible that treatments may influence 
the final scores, thereby causing spurious inference.  To verify this possibility, we also 
administer pre-experimental questionnaires for half the buyers, randomly selected within each 
treatment cell.  Regressions with post-experimental measures of general and knowledge-based 
trust as dependent variables, against pre-experimental measures of each construct and treatment 
variables as independent variables reveal no significant effect of treatments in changing the trust 
scores (results not reported here). 
Subjects 
Our subjects are 104 students at a private American Midwestern university, both 
undergraduate (88.4%) and graduate students (11.6%).  67% of the students are male, and the 
average age is of 20.6 years, ranging from 18 to 34 years.  Each treatment cell involves two 
experimental groups with 13 subjects in each group (6 buyers and 7 sellers).  Subjects are   17
randomly assigned to these groups, as well as to the role of buyer or seller.  At the end of each 
session, subjects received a show-up fee of $5, plus a variable compensation depending on the 
number of points they earned in the experiment, all paid in cash.  The average total compensation 
was around $25 for a two-hour session. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation checks 
We check the effectiveness of our manipulations in two ways.  First, we include in the quiz 
administered right after the experimental instructions some questions to assess the subjects’ 
understanding of experimental parameters and variables affecting payoffs.  Responses are 
checked and discussed before the experiment begins.  Second, we include in the post-
experimental questionnaire some items to measure subjects’ perception of the manipulated 
variables.  Using a seven-point Likert scale, buyers and sellers indicate their agreement to the 
statements “It is likely that sellers’ costs varied a lot from period to period,” and “My costs to 
deliver a high quality good to each buyer varied a lot from period to period,” respectively.  
Scores are significantly larger in the manipulation involving high exchange value uncertainty (p 
< 0.01).  In the case of contract enforcement, the items for buyers and sellers are respectively “I 
had no way to protect myself, even partially, from possible losses associated with a low quality 
good,” and “If I wanted, I could always earn a lot of points by choosing low quality” (all items 
are reverse-scored).  Buyers’ scores are lower in the treatment where contract enforcement is 
available, although with moderate significance (p < 0.10).  In the case of sellers, however, the 
difference is not significant.  This is not problematic here since our primary goal is to assess the 
role of contract enforcement in creating safeguards to buyers, rather than the incentives that the 
contract yields to sellers. 
The determinants of commitment 
 We now examine how experimental treatments and trust influence commitment levels.  We 
employ the measure of commitment proposed by Cook and Emerson (1978) and later adapted by   18
Kollock (1994).  Denote Tij as the number of consummated transactions between buyer i and 
seller j after buyer i has completed t transactions with any seller.  The revealed commitment of 
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This measure approaches 1 if the buyer has transacted with only one seller, and 0 if the buyer 
has transacted equally with all sellers on the market.  Note that this measure of commitment is 
buyer-specific.  Table 3 presents regressions using this measure of commitment as a dependent 
variable, evaluated at the end of each experimental session and for each buyer.  High Uncertainty 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the treatment involves high exchange value uncertainty, and 0 
otherwise.  Contract is a dummy variable coded 1 if contract enforcement is available, and 0 
otherwise.  General Trust and Knowledge-based Trust are the measures of trust described in the 
previous section.  We employ several interactions among these variables to test hypothesized 
effects. 
<Table 3 around here> 
The coefficient of High Uncertainty provides support for Hypothesis 1: an increase in 
exchange value uncertainty tends to reduce commitment.  We note, however, that although the 
effect is significant in model (2) (p < 0.05), it is only moderately significant in models (1) and (3) 
(p < 0.10).  The effect of contract enforcement is also aligned with predictions.  As evidenced by 
the interaction Contract×High Uncertainty, contract enforcement negatively affects commitment 
in conditions of high exchange value uncertainty (p < 0.01).  In conditions of low exchange value 
uncertainty, the effect of contract enforcement is generally insignificant, as evidenced by the 
interaction Contract×Low Uncertainty, although it shows moderate significance (p < 0.10) in 
model (3).  These results lend support for Hypothesis 3: contract enforcement makes individuals 
more willing to move out of committed relationships, especially when exchange value 
uncertainty is high, which implies that there is value in transacting with alternative partners.  
Figure 1 depicts this effect.   19
<Figure 1 around here> 
Model (2) examines the effect of general trust.  Hypothesis 5 predicts that, for buyers 
exhibiting high general trust, the effect of contract enforcement on observed commitment levels 
will be attenuated.  To verify this, we include interactions among General Trust and Contract, 
evaluated at different levels of exchange value uncertainty, besides the variable General Trust 
alone to assess its main effect.  The results refute Hypothesis 5.  General trust appears to 
increase, rather than decrease, commitment (p < 0.05), and also appears to magnify, rather than 
attenuate, the negative effect of contract enforcement in conditions of both high (p < 0.10) and 
low exchange value uncertainty (p < 0.05).  Model (3), in turn, examines the effect of 
knowledge-based trust.  The interaction term Knowledge-based Trust×Contract×High 
Uncertainty is aligned with Hypothesis 6: contract enforcement appears to have a more 
pronounced effect for individuals exhibiting high knowledge-trust, in particular when exchange 
value uncertainty is high (p < 0.05).  Since those individuals tend to value transactions with 
familiar actors, they are likely to perceive higher benefits associated with contract enforcement 
when exchange conditions require fewer committed transactions.        
Together, these results confirm our expectation that an increase in the gains to exchange with 
alternative partners, caused by an escalation of exchange value uncertainty, discourages frequent 
transactions among the same individuals.  However, since we examine a setting involving social 
uncertainty, some individuals are likely to refrain from moving out committed circles unless 
some form of safeguard is in place.  Thus, contract enforcement has a greater effect in reducing 
commitment when exchange value uncertainty is high, which requires social mobility.  By 
contrast, when exchange value uncertainty is low, the benefit of contract enforcement is reduced.  
This is because committed relationships, which emerge as a response to social uncertainty, are 
not strongly penalized: there is little value in severing ongoing relationships to transact with new 
actors.  As for the moderating effect of trust, results are therefore inconsistent with previous 
findings on the role of general trust reported in Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998).  Namely, 
subjects exhibiting higher levels of general trust appear to prefer committed relationships.    20
Furthermore, general trust does not appear to substitute for contract enforcement in boosting 
non-committed transactions.  On the contrary, general trust appears to magnify the effect of 
contract enforcement: individuals with high general trust tend to reduce commitment levels to a 
higher degree than individuals with low general trust when contracts are feasible.  The effect of 
knowledge-based trust, by contrast, is consistent with the idea that individuals who put more 
value in relationships with familiar actors will tend to perceive greater benefits of contract 
enforcement in the support of non-committed exchanges.  
Buyers’ willingness to transact with sellers 
We also observe commitment through a different lens.  Following some field studies 
analyzing the propensity of firms to form relationships (Gulati, 1995b; Podolny, 1994), we 
consider each buyer-seller pair ij as a unit of analysis and attempt to describe factors that may 
induce buyer i to accept the price offer of seller j (coded 1) or to reject this offer (coded 0) in 
each period.  Events where seller j has not proposed any price to buyer i are not considered.  
Since the data have a panel structure with binary dependent variable, we employ the random-
effects probit model proposed by Butler and Moffit (1982), where the time-invariant error term is 
centered on each buyer. 
We use several variables to describe the formation of effective exchange ties.  Price 
Difference is the difference between the price offered by seller j to buyer i in a certain round and 
the minimum price that buyer i received in that round.  Obviously, we expected that the larger 
the difference, the lower the likelihood that the price offer will be accepted.  This variable is 
positively correlated with exchange value uncertainty (correlation coefficient = 0.26, p < 0.01), 
since in the treatment involving high uncertainty the dispersion of seller costs is higher than in 
the treatment involving low uncertainty.  This provides an alternative way to test Hypothesis 1: a 
positive coefficient of Price Difference implies that an increase in the dispersion of costs (and 
hence prices) will tend to make buyers more willing to transact with any seller who offers a 
relatively low price.  As for the effect of contract enforcement, we employ the variable Contract, 
which is coded 1 when contracts are available and 0 otherwise.  Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive   21
coefficient of this variable, since contractual safeguards will make buyers more willing to 
transact with any seller and less willing to exit (i.e., to refuse all offers).  In addition, we employ 
several variables that might affect the formation of exchange ties.  Past Defection is the number 
of times in which seller j delivered low quality to buyer i up to the current period.  Since buyers 
are likely to retaliate for past defection with the termination of an ongoing relationship, we 
expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative.  Relationship Length is the number of 
rounds in which buyer i and seller j effectively transacted up to the current period.  The emerging 
shadow of the past in long-term relationships suggests a positive coefficient of this variable: 
other things being equal, buyers will be more willing to transact with sellers with whom they 
have some experience.  To accommodate possible non-linear effects of this variable (Gulati, 
1995b), we add its squared value in the regressions.  We also include a control variable, 
Endgame, which is coded 1 if the period is above or equal to the 15
th round, where the 
experiment ends with 50% probability, and 0 otherwise.  It is likely that buyers will be more 
willing to exit during this endgame period if they perceive that sellers will be more tempted to 
deliver low quality, since sellers may see little value in preserving their reputation. 
Model (1) in Table 4 presents regression results with these variables.  All variables are 
highly significant (p < 0.01) and with the expected signs.  Buyers are less willing to transact with 
a seller who has defected in the past and whose price is distant from the minimum price on the 
market.  On the other hand, they are more willing to transact with seller with whom they have 
transacted in the past, even though the effect shows diminishing returns.  Results also confirm 
that contractual safeguards increase buyers’ willingness to transact with any seller and avoid 
exiting.  Finally, when there is a likelihood that the experiment will end, buyers are less inclined 
to transact. 
<Table 4 around here> 
Models (3) and (4) assess the impact of general knowledge-based trust respectively, and 
models (4) and (5) expand the regression by including some buyer-specific personal 
characteristics which serve as control variables: Male (coded 1 if the subject is male and 0   22
otherwise), Age (in years), Graduate (coded 1 if the subject is a graduate student), 
Business/Economics Major (coded 1 if the subject falls into this category
4), and Experience 
(equal to 1 if the subject has participated in previous experiments at the lab where our study was 
run
5).  Hypotheses 5 and 6 imply that the variables General Trust and Knowledge-based Trust 
will, respectively, attenuate and magnify the effect of Contract.  Namely, individuals with higher 
general trust will be more willing to transact with any seller regardless of the existence of 
contract enforcement, whereas individuals with higher knowledge-based trust will be less willing 
to transact with any seller indiscriminately (i.e., irrespective of the duration of their exchange) 
unless there is some form of safeguard.  The data do not support these predictions.  The 
coefficients of the interaction terms General Trust×Contract and Knowledge-based 
Trust×Contract are insignificant.  The main effect of Knowledge-based Trust is significantly 
positive according to model (3) (p < 0.05), but its significance disappears when buyer-specific 
characteristics are introduced in model (4).  Regarding the buyer-specific controls showing 
statistical significance, male subjects appear to be less willing to transact with any seller (p < 
0.05), while Business/Economics majors appear to be more inclined to transact (p < 0.10). 
Sellers’ propensity to cooperate 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that buyers’ commitment choices will affect sellers’ propensity to act 
cooperatively, i.e., deliver high quality.  Namely, a reduction in commitment will signal sellers 
that the repetition of the exchange with a particular buyer will be less likely, which damages the 
shadow of the future and hence make sellers less willing to preserve their reputation by not 
defecting.  Also, a reduction in commitment will damage the shadow of the past, as exchanges 
between the same individuals will be less frequent.     
We distinguish between two forms of buyer commitment as perceived by a particular seller.  
We define relational commitment as the extent to which a given buyer maintains a continuous 
                                                 
4 There is evidence that previous training in economics (which is also the case for business students) affects 
subjects’ behavior in social dilemmas (Frank, 1988). 
5 This is important because subjects may learn from experience how to deal with experimental markets.    23
relationship with a particular seller.  We define structural commitment, in turn, as the extent to 
which a given buyer maintains a continuous relationship with all sellers with whom that buyer 
has transacted, which therefore corresponds to the concept of commitment previously used here.  
While relational commitment is dyad-specific—i.e., it refers to a buyers’ reputation of 
maintaining an ongoing relationship with a particular seller—structural commitment is buyer-
specific and thus indicates the market-level reputation that a buyer may form in terms of 
maintaining long-term ties.  To develop a relational commitment reputation with a particular 
seller, a buyer must effectively transact with that seller.  By contrast, a buyer’s structural 
commitment reputation may be perceived by sellers with whom that buyer has never 
transacted—as long as they have information about the buyer’s past exchange ties, which was 
indeed available to the participants of our experiment.  Thus, we create the variable Relational 
Commitment as the proportion of buyer i’s overall transactions that were made with seller j up to 
the current period.  Structural Commitment, in turn, is simply Kollock’s (1994) buyer-specific 
measure of commitment used before, this time calculated at the end of each period.  Both 
Relational and Structural Commitment are within 0 and 1.    
Besides these commitment variables, we consider other variables that may affect 
cooperation.  Rent is equal to the price received by the seller minus his or her production costs to 
deliver high quality.  We should expect a positive effect of this variable on cooperation for two 
reasons.  First, sellers motivated by reciprocity norms may respond positively to a “generous” 
price that yields them satisfactory profits even considering that they incur additional costs to 
deliver high quality (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr, Gächter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997).  Second, sellers may 
perceive that the buyer who accepted a sufficiently high price will be willing to sacrifice short-
term gains to increase the future payoff stream that sellers will likely receive in a long-term 
exchange.  Since sellers will likely lose these future gains if their defection precipitates 
severancing the exchange tie, they may instead find it in their self-interest to keep cooperating   24
(Klein et al., 1981; Telser, 1980).
6  To accommodate non-linear effects associated with Rent (e.g. 
Charness, Frechette, & Kagel, 2001; Lazzarini et al., 2001), we also add its squared term in our 
regressions.  Contract Offered is a dummy variable coded 1 if buyer i chooses to use a contract 
to transact with seller j in each period, and 0 otherwise.
7  There are competing hypothesis on the 
effect of this variable.  On the one hand, the contract may limit the short-term gains that sellers 
may attain by defecting, which favors cooperation (Baker et al., 1994; Klein, 1996).  On the 
other hand, the contract may signal distrust and undermine sellers’ intrinsic motivation to 
cooperate (Deci et al., 1985; Fehr et al., 2000; Frey, 1997; Taylor, 1987).  These incentive-
related effects of contract enforcement are not central to our study since we are primarily 
interested in how contracts create safeguards as perceived by buyers (see however Lazzarini et 
al., 2001).  Relationship Length, in turn, measures the number of past transactions between the 
buyer-seller pair ij.  The idea that the shadow of the past prompts cooperation supports the 
expectation of a positive effect of this variable.  Finally, we add the variable Endgame—since 
sellers are more likely to defect when there is a high likelihood that the experiment will end—
and, for some model specifications, the same subject-specific controls previously used for 
buyers. 
Table 5 presents regression results using the random-effects probit model centering on each 
seller, where the dependent variable is coded 1 if seller j delivers high quality to buyer i in a 
given period, and 0 if the seller delivers low quality.  Only observations where both the buyer 
and the seller have not exited (i.e., when they have agreed on a certain price) are used in the 
regressions. Model (1) includes all the variables described before.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
Relational Commitment is positively related to the likelihood of cooperation (p < 0.01).  
Structural Commitment, however, shows no significant effect.  This suggests that buyers’ 
reputation of preserving a long-term relationship with a particular seller is more important than 
                                                 
6 We are not able to distinguish between these two effects  since the degree to which buyers and sellers expect to 
transact repeatedly is endogenous and cannot be directly measured.  In an experimental setting where this variable is 
exogenous (manipulated), Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger (2001) find support for both effects.   
7 Thus, differently from Contract—which is a treatment variable—Contract Offered is both time-varying and buyer-
specific.   25
their network-level reputation of preserving long-term relationships in general.  One possible 
explanation is that, although sellers are informed about past exchange ties formed by buyers, 
they do not know whether the severance of a certain tie was a retaliation for past defection by the 
seller, or whether the buyer simply switched to an alternative seller with a lower price.  Only the 
latter would damage buyers’ reputation.  We expect that Structural Commitment will have a 
more pronounced role in settings where sellers have information to distinguish between these 
two causes.
8  
As for the other variables, the coefficient of Contract Offered is significantly negative: if the 
buyer offers a contract, one should expect a reduction, rather than an increase, in the likelihood 
of cooperation (p < 0.05).  This preliminary result supports the argument that the use of 
contracts, despite reducing the gains from short-term defection, either signals distrust or reduces 
sellers’ intrinsic motivation to respond cooperatively (though see our further analysis below).  As 
predicted, Rent has a positive effect on cooperation (p < 0.01), even though apparently with 
diminishing returns.  Contrary to our expectation, however, Relationship Length shows a 
negative coefficient (p < 0.01).  This runs counter to the argument that the shadow of the past 
increases individuals’ willingness to cooperate—although, as verified before, it does tend to 
increase individuals’ willingness to transact.
9  Endgame is also significant (p < 0.01), confirming 
the expectation that sellers will be less willing to cooperate when they perceive a low likelihood 
that the exchange will continue. 
<Table 5 around here> 
Models (2) and (3) perform robustness checks.  Model (3) adds seller-specific characteristics 
as control variables.  No seller-specific characteristic shows a significant effect, and the inclusion 
of those controls does not change the qualitative inference about the other variables.  Model (3) 
employs a fixed-effect approach to control for omitted seller-specific characteristics that may 
                                                 
8 Although Relational and Structural Commitment are positively correlated (p < 0.01), the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient (0.46) does not suggest a problem of multicolinearity. 
9 The inclusion of the squared value of Relationship Length, to assess possible curvilinear effects, does not 
significantly improve the model.   26
bias the results.  This is because buyers’ decision to accept or reject a price offer, as well as to 
offer or not a contract, is not controlled in the experiment.  Since there is no satisfactory fixed-
effects estimation approach for the probit model, we employ the fixed-effects (“conditional”) 
logit model suggested by Chamberlain (1980).  This model satisfactorily removes seller-specific 
factors that may be correlated with buyer choices, which are uncontrolled, and hence provides a 
more robust test.
10  Still supporting Hypothesis 2, our results indicate that commitment, 
especially its relational form, is positively related to the likelihood of cooperation (p < 0.01).  
Two major changes in the results with the fixed-effects model are worth noticing.  First, the 
coefficient of Structural Commitment becomes marginally significant, suggesting that both 
relational and structural commitment may be relevant determinants of cooperation (p < 0.10).  
Second, the coefficient of Contract Offered becomes significantly positive, even though with 
moderate significance (p < 0.10).  This suggests that the negative coefficient of this variable in 
the previous specifications was due to omitted seller-specific factors causing a spurious negative 
correlative between the presence of the contract and the likelihood of cooperation.  For instance, 
buyers may employ contracts only for sellers who, for some reason, they perceive to be less 
cooperative.  Contrary to our previous conclusion, this result suggests that contracts appear to 
reduce the perceived gains that sellers can attain with short-term defection—despite the fact that 
contractual incentives are rather weak in our experimental setting.  Thus, contracts appear to not 
only encourage individuals to access new, more profitable exchanges; once initiated, contracts 
also appear to help sustain profitable exchanges.  The inference about the other variables remains 
qualitatively similar to models (1) and (2). 
Exchange performance 
  Hypothesis 4 asserts that contracts will contribute to an increase in exchange performance 
especially in conditions of high exchange value uncertainty.  To measure exchange performance, 
we adopt the simple criterion of summing up, in each period, the experimental points earned by 
                                                 
10 The sample size in the fixed-effects model is reduced due to certain sellers exhibiting lack of variability in their 
responses, which are then completely eliminated with the fixed-effects specification.   27
all buyers and sellers on the market.  The advantage of this criterion is that it treats prices as 
simple monetary transfers (which are canceled out with the sum of buyers’ and sellers’ points) 
and focuses on how the network as a whole matches buyers and sellers who are able to provide 
the lowest possible costs to each buyer.
11  Consider, for instance, the matrix exemplified in the 
third section.  Given the structure of costs, it would be desirable that buyers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 
transact with sellers 5, 1, 4, 6, 4, and 7 respectively in that particular period.  Those sellers have 
the lowest possible production cost to each buyer on the market.    
Table 6 presents regression results with the treatment variables and Endgame as a control 
variable.  Each observation is the total number of points attained by buyers and seller per period.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, contract enforcement increases exchange performance to a greater 
degree when exchange value uncertainty is high, as evidenced by the interaction term 
Contract×High Uncertainty (p = 0.02).  When exchange value uncertainty is low, contract 
enforcement actually decreases performance (p < 0.01).  This supports the idea that contract 
enforcement reduces buyers’ willingness to commit and hence support exchanges with valuable 
sellers, who are not necessarily sellers with whom buyers have transacted in the past when 
exchange value uncertainty is high.  By contrast, in conditions of low exchange value 
uncertainty, the benefits of reducing commitment are minimal and do not outweigh the 
drawbacks associated with contract enforcement—especially, in light of the results previously 
reported, the costs to use contracts when cooperation can be satisfactorily supported through 
committed relationships.  Figure 2 depicts these effects. 
<Table 6 around here> 
<Figure 2 around here> 
                                                 
11 In economics jargon, this criterion measures efficiency in the exchange system using a utilitarian approach.  One 
possible criticism of this criterion is that subjects may derive benefits other than the monetary compensation based 
on experimental points.  For instance, subjects may fell that committed exchanges are more “comfortable” despite 
the existence of more profitable options elsewhere.  To assess this effect, we asked subjects to indicate their 
agreement to the following item using a seven-point Likert scale: “I am satisfied with my outcomes in the 
experiment.”  This item was included in the post-experimental questionnaire and answered before subjects were 
informed about their monetary compensation.  Responses to this item are positively correlated with the number of 
experimental points attained in the experiment: correlation coefficients are 0.50 for buyers, and 0.62 for sellers (p < 
0.01).   28
The positive main effect of High Uncertainty (p < 0.01) is due to the fact that buyers self-
select sellers, even though the average cost in the treatments with low and high exchange value 
uncertainty is the same.  Thus, if buyers randomly select sellers or stick with sellers with whom 
they transacted at the outset, then the cost draws for those sellers who effectively transact with 
buyers should gravitate around the mean value of 50 experimental points.  But since buyers 
endogenously choose their sellers, they are likely to pick sellers with relatively lower prices—
and, hence, lower costs.  Since the minimum possible cost is substantially lower in the treatment 
involving high exchange value uncertainty, it follows that buyers’ self-selection of sellers can 
drive average costs down, which contributes to an increase in exchange performance.  As should 
be expected, Endgame has a negative coefficient (p < 0.01): an increase in sellers’ opportunistic 
actions and buyers’ refusal to transact when it is very likely that the experiment will end. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Committed relationships have been considered an appropriate solution to the problem of 
social uncertainty.  When exchanges are subject to the hazards of opportunism, committed 
relationships promote both the shadow of the future and the shadow of the past necessary for 
cooperation.  For this reason, some argue, exchanges can be self-governed without the need of 
legal enforcement and other formal controls (Ellickson, 1991; Granovetter, 1985; Kollock, 1994; 
Macaulay, 1963; Taylor, 1987).  We show that, while this conclusion is correct when the value 
of a long-term relationship does not vary much over time, it is invalid when individuals face high 
exchange value uncertainty—i.e., when there are constantly new opportunities to transact with 
more valuable partners outside committed circles.  High exchange value uncertainty mandates a 
reduction in commitment—i.e., higher social mobility (Blau, 1964)—to increase exchange 
performance.  But, by reducing commitment, individuals undermine cooperation in settings 
involving social uncertainty.  Thus, to encourage individuals to move out of committed 
relationships in conditions of both social and exchange value uncertainty, mechanisms that 
provide safeguards and reduce possible losses in non-committed relations become important.    29
We explore in this paper the role of contract enforcement along these lines, and find 
experimental support for our hypothesis that contracts are particularly beneficial when exchange 
value uncertainty is high.  To be sure, this result depends on several parameters chosen in the 
experiment, in particular the nature of contract enforcement and its associated costs.  For 
instance, if contracts are excessively costly or if the likelihood of effective enforcement is very 
low, then contracts will not be useful in any condition.  However, our results do refute the idea 
that committed relationships substitute for the need of legal enforcement in the support of 
exchanges.  Effective contracts allow individuals to move more confidently out of committed 
relationships and initiate new, more valuable exchanges that emerge when exchange value 
uncertainty is high.  
We also examine the role of trust as a personal trait that influences commitment choices 
(Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi et al., 1994) and the perceived benefits of contract 
enforcement.  We find no clear and consistent effect of trust.  This can be due to at least two 
reasons.  First, trust is not a manipulated variable in our experimental setting.  Thus, our study 
may lack sufficient heterogeneity to assess the effect of this variable on commitment decisions.  
Different results may be obtained in cross-national studies with higher variance in trust and 
where individuals with different levels of trust are grouped into particular treatment cells (e.g. 
Yamagishi et al., 1998).  A second problem may be associated with the measurement of trust 
using psychometric scales.  Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) find no consistent 
relationship between subjects’ responses to those scales and their responses in a “trust” game 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) where their own choices reveal the extent to which they 
expect other subjects to act opportunistically. They suggest that the measurement of trust using 
actual play may be more convincing.  In our context, we could argue that buyers who reveal 
lower commitment in their market exchanges are more willing to trust sellers.  But this would 
imply a tautological relationship between trust and commitment decisions, and hence would not 
allow us to test, for example, how trust—as a personal trait—moderates the effect of contract   30
enforcement on commitment.  Future studies should focus specifically on how trust may interact 
with contract enforcement and attempt to solve such methodological issues. 
Our study has important implications for practice.   Several authors have stressed the virtues 
of committed exchanges in several contexts—buyer-supplier relations (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Helper, 1991), firm networks (Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1996), local communities (Ellickson, 1991) 
and so forth.  However, despite the fact that cooperation is prevalent in those contexts, the 
expansion of markets and the specialization of activities are likely to bring valuable exchange 
opportunities outside committed circles.  Thus, North (1990) posits that economic growth has 
been invariably associated with an enlargement of trade networks, which implies that individuals 
transact less frequently.  Whenever markets expand and individuals specialize, innovations and 
new trade opportunities tend to constantly emerge outside committed circles, which makes the 
value of existing long-term ties uncertain.  But to pursue those valuable opportunities, 
individuals must overcome the hazards of opportunism that tend to escalate in infrequent 
exchanges.  In this sense, formal enforcement mechanisms become instrumental in supporting 
cooperation when economic expansion reduces the extent to which individuals transact 
repeatedly (Greif, 1997).
12  Thus, Zucker (1986) discusses how the industrial development in the 
United States was associated with an increase in social mobility, leading to the development of 
formal safeguarding institutions such as legislation and regulatory bureaus.  More recently, the 
expansion of trade networks resulting from globalization and new information technologies such 
as the Internet have raised questions about how to support infrequent exchanges among 
strangers.   
                                                 
12 We note that even non-repeated exchanges may show high levels of cooperation if there is some form of market-
level reputation mechanism in place—i.e., a buyer boycotts a seller who has defected in exchanges with other 
buyers—and information about past behavior is perfectly disseminated (Kandori, 1992).  However, this does not 
preclude the existence of formal mechanisms to gather information and enforce retaliation strategies: market 
participants may not be willing incentives to share information and promote boycotts.  Thus, legal enforcement may 
have another role: it may not only help to safeguard exchanges and provide explicit incentives, but it may also help 
to disseminate information about past opportunistic behavior in a large trade network and enforce collective 
sanctions (Greif, Milgrom, & Weingast, 1994; Milgrom et al., 1990).  This distinct benefit of formal enforcement is 
an interesting topic to be examined in future experiments.   31
Thus, while many have highlighted the virtues of economic systems that substitute legal 
support for high levels of social commitment, our research highlights the weakness of these 
systems.  They poorly support exchanges with strangers and thus discourage the search for 
valuable exchange partners.  Firms must often forego the full gains from trade that could be 
accessed were adequate legal institutions available to support exchanges with new actors.  Given 
the importance of settings where commitment is at the same time a solution (e.g., under high 
social uncertainty) and a burden (e.g., under high exchange value uncertainty), further theoretical 
and empirical examination about how individuals may reconcile such conflicting demands 
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Table 1 
Payoffs (in experimental points) for a given price p submitted by the seller and accepted by the 
buyer, and a given cost c, which the seller incurs to deliver high quality 
 
  Seller’s choice of quality 
  Low quality  High quality 
Buyer does not 
use contract 
Buyer: – p  
Seller: p 
Buyer: 100 – p 




Contract is enforced: 
Buyer: 100 – p – 5  
Seller: p – c  
Contract is not enforced: 




Buyer: 100 – p – 5 
Seller: p – c  
Note:  Costs c vary across sellers, buyers with whom sellers transact, and periods.  
Costs are randomly draw from a discrete uniform distribution between 0 and 100 in 
the treatment involving high exchange value uncertainty, and between 45 and 55 in 
the treatment involving low exchange value uncertainty. 
   36
Table 2 
Items used to measure general and knowledge-based trust (based on Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 
1994) and their factor loadings in a two-factor model (promax rotation) 
 
Items  Factor 1  Factor 2
General Trust     
1. Most people are trustful of others.  0.647  -0.007
2. Most people are trustworthy.  0.931  -0.088
3. Most people are basically dishonest.*  -0.653  0.038
4. I am trustful.  0.428  0.310
5. Most people will respond in kind when they are trusted by others.  0.328  0.478
6. Most people are basically good and kind.  0.810  -0.049
   
Knowledge-based Trust   
1. Whatever work I have to perform, I feel more secure when I work with 
someone I know well than with someone I don’t know. 
-0.084  0.854
2. I trust a person I don’t know more than one I know well.*  0.095  -0.773
3. The people I trust are those with whom I have had long-lasting 
relationships. 
-0.053  0.779
4. Generally, a person with whom you have had a longer relationship is 
likely to help you when you need it. 
0.010  0.782
Notes: 
* Reverse-scored item. 
Log likelihood = -16.903.  χ
2 (two factors vs. no factor) = 209.56 (p < 0.001). 
Loadings in italics correspond to items used in the final measures. 
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Table 3 
Variables affecting buyers’ commitment 
 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 





















General Trust    0.075 
(0.044)
*    
General Trust×Contract 
   ×High Uncertainty 
 -0.074 
(0.048)
†    
General Trust×Contract 
   ×Low Uncertainty 
 -0.151 
(0.071)
*    




   ×Contract×High Uncertainty 




   ×Contract×Low Uncertainty 










N  48 48  48   
F  12.22** 6.87** 12.73 **
R
2 0.26  0.31  0.29   
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable is buyers’ observed commitment over all experimental rounds using 
Kollock’s (1994) measure. 
** p < 0.01  * p < 0.05  † p < 0.10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects). 
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Table 4 
Variables affecting buyers’ willingness to transact with sellers 
 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
























































General Trust    0.007 
(0.041)
   -0.015 
(0.042) 
  
General Trust×Contract   0.034 
(0.053)
   0.003 
(0.057) 
  
Knowledge-based Trust      0.057 
(0.031)
*     0.034 
(0.032)
 
Knowledge-based Trust×Contract     -0.036 
(0.060)
     0.016 
(0.068)
 















































N  4,144 4,144 4,144 4,144   4,144 
Log likelihood  -1,435.04  -1,434.29  -1,433.21** 1,426.39   1,425.69 
χ
2  621.37** 622.45** 623.42** 631,99 **  632.85**
Notes: 
Estimates of random-effects probit model centered on each buyer.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure coded 1 if buyer i transacts with seller j in a given period and 0 
otherwise.  Events where seller j has not proposed any price to buyer i are excluded from the sample. 
** p < 0.01  * p < 0.05  † p < 0.10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects). 
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Table 5 
Variables affecting sellers’ willingness to cooperate (deliver high quality) 
 
 Model 













































Male   -0.483 
(0.365)
    
Age   0.052 
(0.072)
    
Graduate   -0.811 
(0.697)
    
Business/Economics Major    -0.283 
(0.316)
    
Experience   0.137 
(0.348)












    
N  661 661 524   
Log likelihood  -224.82  -222.66  -121.37  
χ
2  100.10** 98.66** 164.32 ** 
Notes: 
Models (1) and (2): estimates of random-effects probit model centered on each seller. 
Model (3): estimates of fixed-effects (“conditional”) logit model centered on each seller. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure coded 1 if seller j delivers high quality to 
buyer i in a given period and 0 otherwise.  Events where either the buyer or the seller 
have exited (i.e., have not agreed on a certain price) are excluded from the sample. 
** p < 0.01  * p < 0.05  † p < 0.10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects). 
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Table 6 
Exchange value uncertainty, contract enforcement, and exchange performance 
 
 Dependent  variable: 
Sum of buyers’ and 
sellers’ payoffs 















N  123 




Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 















































































Sum of buyers’ and sellers’ payoffs per period according to experimental treatments 
 
 
 
190
210
230
250
270
290
310
330
350
Low High
Exchange value uncertainty
P
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Contract
No contract